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ABSTRACT

Regulation is designed to improve the performance of individual and
organizational behavior in ways that reduce social harms, whether by
improving industry's environmental performance, increasing the safety of
transportationsystems, or reducing workplace risk. Regulators can direct
those they govern to improve theirperformance in at least two basic ways.
They can prescribe exactly what actions regulated entities must take to
improve their performance. Or they can incorporatethe regulation'sgoal
into the language of the rule, specifying the desired level of performance
and allowing the targets of regulation to decide how to achieve that level.
This second approach is the subject of this article, which summarizes the
discussion at a workshop organized last year by the Regulatory Policy
Programat HarvardUniversity. The workshop brought togetherdecisionmakers from a dozen different government agencies as well as leading
researchersfrom the fields of economics, engineering, law, and political
science. The dialogue at the workshop, as summarized in this article,
builds on the experiences of different regulatory agencies that have used
performance-based regulation and clarifies its advantages and
disadvantagesin addressinghealth, safety, and environmentalproblems.

INTRODUCTION

For many people, the word "regulation" conjures up an image of detailed
rules telling individuals and businesses what they can and cannot do. Yet
instead of establishing specific prescriptions (or proscriptions) for behavior,
regulations can also set goals for the outcome of that behavior. A
performance-based regulation sets performance goals and allows
individuals and firms to decide how to meet them.'
The idea of setting performance goals, rather than specifying behavior,
dates back at least to one of the earliest-known public laws, the Hammurabi

1. See, e.g., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., PERFORMANCE BASED REGULATIONS GUIDE
(1998); W. KIP Viscusi, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE
WORKPLACE 128-29 (1983); STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 105 (1982);
PROJECT ON ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY APPROACHES, PERFORMANCE STANDARDS: A
PRACTICAL

GUIDE TO

ALTERNATIVE (1981).

THE

USE OF

PERFORMANCE

STANDARDS

AS A

REGULATORY
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Code.2 Over the past decade, the idea of having government regulatory
agencies set goals for performance has received increasing attention?
Interest in performance-based regulation is reflected in a number of
regulatory developments and initiatives. For example, Executive Order
No. 12866, issued by President Clinton and retained by President Bush,
directs agencies wherever feasible to specify performance objectives, rather
than behavior, in crafting new regulations. In addition, several regulatory
agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency and the Federal
Highway Administration, have experimented with initiatives for creating
alternative regulatory requirements for firms that demonstrate a superior
level of performance. 5 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the
Department of Transportation's Office of Pipeline Safety have initiated
risk-informed, performance-based approaches to achieving their safety
regulatory goals. 6 These and other agency efforts to focus on performance
are premised on a desire to achieve the same results as other standards,
while giving firms the flexibility to achieve those results in a cost-effective
manner.
Despite growing interest in the performance of government regulation,
2. CODE OF HAMMURABI 112 (L.W. King trans.), available at http://www.yale.edu/
lawweb/avalon/medieval/hamframe.htm. The Code specifies, among other things, that a
builder of a house "must make the walls solid" and of a ship must "make it tight." See also
Greg C. Foliente, Developments in Performance-BasedBuilding Codes and Standards, 50
FOREST PRODS. J. 12, 13 (2000) (noting the performance-based building standards in the
Hammurabi Code).
3. See Steven Kelman, Public Management: The Power of Performance Measures,
GOVT. EXEC. MAG., June 1, 2001, at http://www.govexec.com/features/0601/0601pubmanage.htm. This emphasis on setting performance has been formalized in the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993, 5 U.S.C. § 306 (2000); 31 U.S.C. §§ 1105(a)(29),
1115-19, 3515(a), 9703-04 (2000); 39 U.S.C. §§ 2801-05 (2000) [hereinafter GPRA].
4. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § l(b)(8), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993) (directing
federal agencies to develop a more efficient regulatory scheme by adopting performancebased standards).
5. The Environmental Protection Agency has established a variety of initiatives over
the past decade that are focused on recognizing firms that achieve superior levels of
environmental performance, including Project XL and the National Environmental
Performance Track. See, e.g., ALFRED A. MARCUS ET AL., REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION: LESSONS FROM PROJECT XL (2002) (describing Project XL); Dennis D. Hirsch,
Second Generation Policy and the New Economy, 29 CAP. U. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (2001)
(describing EPA's Performance Track program). In the late 1990s, the Federal Highway
Administration created a pilot project to create a more flexible, performance-focused
regulatory environment for "exemplary" motor carriers. See Motor carrier Regulatory
Relief and Safety Demonstration Project, 63 Fed. Reg. 37,619 (July 13, 1998).
6. See Nuclear Regulatory Commission, High-Level Guidelines for PerformanceBased Activities (2000), at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/
secys/2000/secy2000-0191/2000-0191 scy.html; Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Guidance
for Performance-Based Regulation (2002), at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rmdoc-collections/nuregs/brochures/br0303/index.html (describing high level principles for NRC's
performance-based approach); Office of Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity Management in
High Consequence Areas, 67 Fed. Reg. 2,136, 2,140 (Jan. 16, 2002) (indicating that new
regulation issued by the Office of Pipeline Safety, a part of RSPA, was "written using a
performance-based approach").
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researchers have yet to subject performance-based standards to close
empirical scrutiny. There has been relatively little study of how
performance-based regulation works in practice across different regulatory
settings. Moreover, in many areas of regulation, the use of performancebased standards has remained less frequent than might be expected. Many
regulatory standards still specify particular behaviors, technologies,
procedures, or processes rather than setting a performance target and
allowing firms the flexibility to achieve that goal.
There may be good reasons why government regulators do not rely more
extensively on performance targets. Performance-based standards depend
on the ability of government agencies to specify, measure, and monitor
performance, but reliable and appropriate information about performance
When
may sometimes be difficult if not impossible to obtain. 8
implemented in the wrong way, or under the wrong conditions,
performance-based regulation will function poorly, as will any regulatory
instrument that is ineffectually deployed.
What is the role, then, for performance-based standards in the regulator's
toolbox? Once it is determined that some form of government regulation is
needed to solve a particular problem, what are the conditions under which a
performance-based standard is the appropriate regulatory instrument?
What particular challenges can be expected to arise in implementing
performance-based regulation?
These questions framed the discussion that took place at the Regulatory
Policy Program's workshop on performance-based regulation last year.
This article, summarizing that discussion, is organized around four major
themes that emerged during the workshop:
*

Defining Performance-Based Regulation

*

Conditions for Performance-Based Regulation

*

Information and Uncertainty

*

Implementing Performance-Based Regulation
I. DEFINING PERFORMANCE-BASED REGULATION

Performance can be integrated into the mission and activities of
regulatory agencies in four principal ways. Specifically, a regulatory
system that is performance-based can be thought of as one in which

7. See W. Kip Viscusi & Ted Gayer, Safety at Any Price?, 25 REGULATION 54, 55, 60
(2002) (describing conventional tendency toward technology standards).
8. See BREYER, supra note 1, at 105 (noting that "performance standards are often
difficult to enforce" because of the challenges associated with developing appropriate tests
of performance).
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performance is used as:
1.

the basis for the legal commands found in regulatory standards,

2.

a criterion for allocating enforcement and compliance resources,

3.

a trigger for the application of differentiated (or tiered) regulatory
standards, and
9
a basis for evaluating regulatory programs and agencies.

4.

The first of these conceptions-namely performance standards-is
probably the most common in the literature on policy instrument choice,
but other notions of performance-based regulation also frequently arise in
policy and academic discourse. To analyze the potential and limitations of
performance-based regulation, it is important to be clear about what one
means by this approach to improving regulation. The workshop discussion
summarized in this article focused on the first of the above concepts:
performance standards, or using performance as the basis for the legal
commands found in government regulations.
At the workshop, there was general agreement on a basic definition of
performance standards. A performance standard specifies the outcome
required, but leaves the specific measures to achieve that outcome up to the
discretion of the regulated entity.' ° In contrast to a design standard or a
technology-based standard that specifies exactly how to achieve
compliance, a performance standard sets a goal and lets each regulated
entity decide how to meet it.
Participants offered several refinements to this general definition,
identifying different ways that performance-based standards can be
distinguished. These distinctions were based on (1) the precision of the
regulation; (2) the underlying basis for the threshold reflected in the
performance standard; (3) the scope of the regulation's ultimate objective
and the location of the rule in the causal chain of events leading to that
ultimate objective; and (4) the type of problem the standard aims to solve.
With respect to the precision of the regulations, performance standards
For example, a loosely
can be either loosely or tightly specified."
9. For amplifications and illustrations of these four conceptions of performance-based
regulation, see Cary Coglianese et al., Performance and Regulation: A Conceptual Overview
available at
with
authors),
on
file
(unpublished
manuscript,
(2002)
http://ksghome.harvard.edu/-.CCoglianese.Academic.Ksg/PBRconceptualover-view.pdf
10. See NEIL GIJNNINGHAM & RICHARD JOHNSTONE, REGULATING WORKPLACE SAFETY:
SYSTEMS AND SANCTIONS 23 (1999) (defining a performance standard as "a standard [that]
specifies the outcome of the ... improvement but which leaves the concrete measure to
achieve this end open for the [regulated entity] to adapt to varying local circumstances").
11. For discussion of the precision of legal rules, see Colin Diver, The Optimal
Precision ofAdministrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 65-66 (1983).
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specified performance standard could require that vegetation adjacent to
railroad track be controlled so that it "does not become a fire hazard or
obstruct visibility." Such a regulation provides less guidance to the
railroad (and gives more discretion to both the railroad and the regulator)
than does a tightly specified regulation requiring that vegetation be
controlled so that it "remains at least three feet away" from railroad track.
Most loosely specified standards call for regulators to make qualitative
judgments, while many tightly specified standards employ quantitative
measures of performance.12
Performance standards can also be distinguished according to how levels
of performance are determined. One participant distinguished quantitative
standards that are based on predictions (e.g., computer simulations of
nuclear power plants) from those that are based on actual measurements
(e.g., smoke-stack emissions measured with a continuous monitoring
device).
Another participant distinguished between (a) performance
standards that are based on a determination of the appropriate level of risk
and (b) standards set according to the level of performance that is
achievable or feasible using known technologies.
Performance-based standards also differ based on the distance between
their performance targets and the ultimate objective that motivated the
decision to develop a regulation. One workshop participant coined the
term "trans-performance standards" to refer to standards that focus on an
ultimate societal objective, such as water quality, rather than more narrow
objectives, such as effluent limits.' 3 On a related note, participants noted
that the amount of flexibility embodied in a given standard can only be
understood in reference to the ultimate goal of the standard.
A
performance standard that simply codifies a broad societal objective (such
as preventing injuries from airplane crashes) will undoubtedly allow firms
substantial discretion. In contrast, a regulation that specifies a narrower or
subsidiary goal (such as requiring that aircraft have sufficient engine power
to reach cruising altitudes quickly) allows firms less discretion in how they
will meet the ultimate objective.
Finally, performance standards can be distinguished based on the types
of problems they are designed to solve. Key characteristics of problems
.include the severity and likelihood (or frequency) of the problems, as well
as the number of regulated entities and other affected individuals or groups.
For example, standards that deal with high-consequence, low-probability
12. Professor Kip Viscusi has argued that whenever possible, performance standards
should be specified in quantitative terms. Viscusi, supra note 1, at 130.
13. For a similar distinction in the context of occupational safety and health regulation,
see id. at 129 (distinguishing between standards governing "particular workplace
conditions" and "the extreme case" of a performance standard that uses workplace injuries
or fatalities as the basis of the standard).
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events (e.g., a meltdown of a nuclear power plant or a pipeline explosion)
are likely to differ in important ways from standards that deal with lowconsequence, high-probability events (e.g., food-borne illnesses or traffic
infractions).
In light of these various ways to distinguish among performance
standards, several participants noted the need to develop a more refined
taxonomy of performance standards to avoid confusion and facilitate better
decision-making. An important step for future research will be to develop
a clearer conceptualization of the different types of performance standards.
II. CONDITIONS FOR PERFORMANCE-BASED REGULATION

There is surely no single answer to the question of whether regulatory
agencies should use performance-based regulation. That is, performancebased regulation is not a "magic bullet" or "one size fits all" approach
applicable to all situations, especially given the numerous conceptual
differences among performance standards outlined in the previous
section. 14 In determining whether to use a performance standard, and if so,
the specific type of standard to adopt (e.g., loosely vs. tightly specified),
decision-makers need to consider the conditions under which the standard
will be applied.
Participants discussed several general considerations about the strengths
and weaknesses of performance standards. By focusing on outcomes, for
example, performance standards give firms flexibility and make it possible
for them to seek the lowest-cost means to achieve the stated level of
performance.15
Performance standards can also accommodate
technological change and the emergence of new hazards in ways that
prescriptive technology-based standards generally cannot. 16 However,
performance-based standards can sometimes be imprecise, especially when
the standards are loosely specified. In addition, in some contexts,
measuring performance presents distinct challenges, such as when the
standards are based on predictions rather than actual measurable events.
Several participants noted that even these general claims about the
advantages and disadvantages of performance-based regulation need to be
assessed concretely, within the context of specific regulatory problems and
possible alternative standards. After all, performance-based standards may
be defined very narrowly, for example, by specifying the performance of a

14. Id. (noting that "it is an oversimplification to claim that [performance standards] are
always preferable").
15. See id. at 130-31 ("The central advantage of performance standards is that the firm
has the opportunity to select the least costly means of compliance.").
16. See BREYER, supra note 1, at 105 ("A performance standard permits flexibility and
change.").
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pump in an industrial process. In-such cases, they may actually offer little
discretion to regulated entities.17 Even when performance standards are
broadly defined, for example, requiring an overall level of safety at nuclear
power plants, they may require strict adherence to highly specified and
prescriptive modeling methodologies that could bring back many of the
shortcomings of a prescriptive approach, especially if a firm's computer
simulation itself must be approved by the regulator. In cases such as these,
the regulated entities' discretion may be significantly constrained even with
a performance standard.
Similarly, participants noted that performance-based regulations may
impose excessive costs on business, particularly small firms, because firms
must search for ways to meet regulatory standards. Some firms may
simply prefer to be told exactly what to do, rather than incur costs to
identify steps needed to achieve a performance standard. In some settings,
non-binding codes of practice have been developed by government, trade
associations, or standards organizations to provide guidance to firms that
lack the resources to determine how to meet regulatory requirements on
their own. But such codes of practice sometimes effectively take the form
of prescriptive standards that performance standards are supposed to
replace. IS
Several participants noted that performance standards may be used to
address a variety of risks, from repeated and expected harms such as
emissions of industrial pollution, to rare and catastrophic events such as
fires, oil tanker spills, or nuclear power plant accidents. These participants
argued that performance standards present fewer implementation issues in
cases where actual performance can be evaluated and verified. For
example, when direct and continuous monitoring of smokestack emissions
is possible, performance can be clearly verified. In contrast, performance
cannot be directly measured for rare and catastrophic events, and instead
9
must be predicted, making implementation more difficult.
In deciding which type of regulatory instrument to use, regulators will
want to consider the risk of making a mistake. Since the consequences of
regulatory failure in the areas of airline safety or the operation of nuclear
17. Id. (noting that sometimes regulators "write performance specifications that could
be met only by a machine of a certain design").

18. See EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK, THE PROBLEM OF
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 236-37 (1982) (pointing out that in some cases even

technically non-binding "government 'guidelines' come to be treated as binding rules").
19. See Kathy Notarianni & Paul S. Fischbeck, Performance with Uncertainty: A
Process for Implementing Performance-Based Fire Regulations, in IMPROVING
REGULATION: CASES IN ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH, AND SAFETY 233, 239 (Paul S. Fischbeck &
R. Scott Farrow eds., 2001) (noting how the complexity of the computer modeling required
with predicting performance may make it more difficult to implement performance
standards than so-called prescriptive standards).
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reactors will typically be more pronounced than in the areas of landfill
operations or consumer products, the nature and extent of these
consequences may affect the desirability of performance standards versus
design standards. For example, design standards might be preferred when
there is high risk and existing technologies are known to work well.
While it is often useful for conceptual purposes to distinguish
performance standards from design standards, participants acknowledged
that in practice the two approaches can be better thought of as end points
along a spectrum of regulatory approaches.2 0 In other words, when setting
standards, regulatory agencies usually select a point on a spectrum running
from what might be considered "pure" performance standards to "pure"
design standards, depending on the level of discretion afforded the targets
of regulation.
Although several participants suggested that performance-based
standards are probably preferable to design standards in the vast majority of
situations, these and other participants recognized that there is little
empirical evidence to support this claim. Indeed, many participants
acknowledged that there is a dearth of empirical studies aimed at measuring
the effectiveness of performance-based standards, especially in comparison
with the effectiveness of other regulatory instruments.2 '
Several participants suggested that, for many purposes, regulators need
to choose hybrid approaches that may minimize some of the weaknesses of
both design and performance standards. In other words, regulators do not
have to choose between these two types of standards but in many cases can
use a blend of instruments.
One approach is to require specific
technologies or designs, but to add to the regulation so-called equivalency
clauses or provisions for alternative compliance mechanisms. These
provisions effectively allow firms to "opt-out" of the prescriptive standard
if they can demonstrate that they can achieve a comparable level of
performance through other means.
In addition, most regulatory systems probably include a combination of
various types of standards, as well as elements of tiered regulations,
20. See GUNNINGHAM & JOHNSTONE, supra note 10, at 23 (arguing that "specification"
standards and "performance" standards are "polar extremes on a continuum" and that any
"real world standard can be located on the continuum somewhere between the two poles");
see also PROJECT ON ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY APPROACHES, supra note 1, at 1 ("In
practice, the distinction between performance standards and design standards is better
characterized as a continuum than a simple dichotomy.").
21. At the conference, we asked participants if they could point us toward any
systematic empirical studies that compared performance standards with design or
technology standards. In addition, we conducted extensive searches in the academic
literature, asked colleagues who were not at the conference, and solicited input via a global
Internet listserv devoted to regulatory policy. In the end, we were unable to locate any
systematic empirical study evaluating the impact of performance standards relative to other
regulatory approaches.
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equivalency clauses, alternative compliance mechanisms, and codes of
practice. In other words, any given regulatory response to a policy problem
may include both a mandate for use of a particular design as well as
performance thresholds. For example, to ensure passenger safety in trains,
the Federal Railroad Administration has mandated that train cars be built
using a crash energy management design so that portions of cars absorb
some of the impact of a crash, but it has also established a performancebased standard for how much of the impact must be absorbed in crash
tests.22 In other cases, regulators set performance goals but provide designor technology-based guidance in the form of codes of practice.
Participants generally agreed that all types of regulatory instruments
have a role to play, depending on the situation at hand. The challenge for
decision-makers and researchers is to identify the conditions under which
different tools are appropriate, while also keeping an eye on changing
conditions or new alternatives. Many of the important criteria to consider
when selecting the appropriate regulatory tools emerged from the workshop
discussion, including effectiveness, efficiency, equity, clarity, and the ease
and accuracy of enforcement.
III. INFORMATION AND UNCERTAINTY

Performance-based regulation raises a number of issues relating to
uncertainty, information, and the role of experts in regulatory decisionmaking.
Perhaps the biggest uncertainty is the performance of
performance-based standards. Participants noted a general absence of
empirical studies evaluating the effectiveness of performance-based
standards, let alone systematic work showing when, where, and how well
performance-based standards work in various regulatory settings.
Participants noted that loosely specified performance-based standards,
by definition, create uncertainty for both regulators and regulated entities
with respect to enforcement and compliance issues. Moreover, regulators
who are accustomed to enforcing relatively straightforward prescriptive
standards are frequently uncomfortable with the discretion inherent in
loosely specified performance-based standards.
Some participants
speculated that it may take years (if not a generation or more) for regulators
to become accustomed to new discretion, though some participants argued
that regulators with more professional training (or higher levels of
education) might adapt more quickly. Participants also noted that regulated
entities may be uncomfortable with loosely specified performance
standards because they believe such standards give regulators too much

22.

Crash Energy Management, 49 C.F.R. § 238.403 (2002).
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discretion when deciding enforcement issues,
Participants acknowledged that even tightly specified performance
standards, including ones that specify quantitative thresholds for
performance, can raise at least two sets of issues related to uncertainty.
First, setting optimal quantitative thresholds requires a detailed
understanding of the dose-response relationships among the precursors and
the ultimate objective. For example, setting optimal emissions thresholds
requires an understanding of the relationship between emissions and human
health outcomes. In practice, however, these dose-response relationships
are sometimes poorly understood, thereby making it difficult to determine
the optimal thresholds.
Second, many participants agreed that performance-based standards
work well when actual performance can be measured, evaluated, and
verified. However, considerable uncertainty arises when this is not the
case. In that situation, simulation models are frequently used to make
predictions, but these models can have distinct limitations. For example,
the factors contributing to a rare event can be extremely numerous, leading
to a high level of model complexity. Since it is generally impossible to
simulate every potential scenario, predictions are necessarily limited in
scope. Moreover, constructing and using such models requires making
value judgments, such as determining what is an acceptable threshold for
temperature in a burning building. 24 The models also require assumptions
about the processes underlying performance, such as how people will react
when they hear a fire alarm. Participants also noted that many types of
uncertainties often go unrecognized or ignored.
Furthermore, the limitations of predictive models are frequently not well
understood, so researchers sometimes may not even know what may be
These and other limitations increase
missing from their analysis.
cannot be easily evaluated or
actual
performance
uncertainty when
2
5
Moreover, such verification problems are not limited to rare,
verified.
high-consequence events, such as fires or nuclear melt-downs, but can arise
in any situation where performance cannot be measured reliably.
One participant voiced concern that performance standards based on
23. See John Braithwaite et al., Raising the Standard:Resident CenteredNursing Home
Regulation in Australia 10 (Aged and Community Care Service Development and
Evaluation Reports No. 10, 1993) (noting that businesses like certainty and that design or
technology standards can provide greater certainty and guidance); Viscusi, supra note 1, at
129 (arguing that if performance standards are not specified precisely "the result may be
capricious enforcement creating so much uncertainty that firms will forgo making
improvements until after they are inspected and penalized").
24. See Notarianni & Fischbeck, supra note 19, at 254.
25. For a discussion of how to analyze uncertainty when it does arise in policymaking,
see M. GRANGER MORGAN & MAx HENRION, UNCERTAINTY: A GUIDE TO DEALING WITH
UNCERTAINTY INQUANTrTATrvE RISK AND POLICY ANALYSIS

172-216 (1990).
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predictive models could lead to "legitimate self-delusion" on the part of
regulated entities. In other words, regulated entities may present or
interpret their models and data in a way that makes it look as if their
proposed approaches will perform well, when in fact a more disinterested
examination would reveal problems with the analysis. 6
Nevertheless, several participants noted that considerable progress has
been made in recent years in developing tools to quantify risk. They
mentioned that probabilistic risk assessment, for example, is one tool that
pulls together all of the elements of risk. 7 Some participants cautioned
that these new tools require large amounts of data to run successfully;
however, others noted that such tools are most valuable when little data is
available. After all, agencies have to deal with uncertainty in any case,
whether or not they use a formal risk assessment methodology to inform
their decision. Probabilistic risk assessment simply offers a systematic
approach to addressing uncertainty.
Several participants noted that a.prescriptive approach to standard setting
can sometimes be a "fig leaf' hiding underlying uncertainties, since the
actual performance level inherent in prescriptive standards may be
unknown and even at times unexamined. Perhaps this is why, as one
participant suggested, the decision to consider using performance standards
can offer benefits simply in terms of "shaking things up" or focusing the
policy dialogue on the ultimate objectives and the underlying uncertainties.
Performance-based regulation may demand more explicit attention to goals
and uncertainties, and this attention can be valuable regardless of the
specific regulatory instrument selected.
The key is to use all of the available evidence at hand: statistical,
laboratory, and expert judgment. Participants suggested that a systematic
approach to this evidence can help focus decision-making on the important
issues. However, other participants noted that quantification of uncertainty
might sometimes fail to make decision-making any easier because even
after using predictive models, policymakers must still decide how much
26. Humans have a tendency to interpret data in a light favorable to their own interest.
For a recent discussion of the effects of this self-serving bias in another context, see Max H.
Bazerman et at., Why GoodAccountants Do BadAudits, 80 HARV. Bus. REv. 3, 3-8 (2002).
27. Risk assessment is a systematic method for determining the probability and
consequences of an undesirable occurrence, such as an accident or fatality. NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT 4 (1994). Probabilistic
risk assessment, a term used widely in the area of nuclear safety regulation, involves
defining and characterizing undesirable occurrences, identifying their potential causes,
calculating the probability for each occurrence, and ranking or weighting the various
occurrences according to the likelihood (and consequence) of their occurring. See generally
Vicki M. Bier, An Overview of Probabilistic Risk Analysis for Complex Engineered
Systems, in FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK ANALYSIS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 67 (Vlosta Molak
ed., 1997); see also Vicki M. Bier et al., A Survey of Approaches for Assessing and
Managing the Risk of Extremes, 19 RISK ANALYSIS 1,83 (1999).
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safety to require.
Participants raised several general concerns about uncertainty, applicable
both to loosely specified and tightly specified performance standards. One
participant noted that uncertainty can arise from changing circumstances.
For example, a building may change from its originally intended use or it
may deteriorate, and these changes could affect the performance of firesuppression devices that were originally predicted to be safe, based on the
initial conditions.2
Uncertainty can also be introduced simply in the
process of drafting regulations. That is, even assuming that all the affected
parties understand and agree with the spirit of a given regulation, it is often
difficult to find the exact words to capture that spirit without leaving room
for interpretation or manipulation, and thereby creating uncertainty.
Participants also discussed the issue of who "owns" the uncertainty.
There are many actors involved in the regulatory process, so it is important
to consider who gains and who loses as a result of uncertainty, as well as
whose responsibility it is to try to reduce that uncertainty. Should it be the
responsibility of federal agencies, the states, standard-setting organizations,
industry, or some combination of these different entities? Whose goals and
values are served by focusing on the uncertainty? Who controls the
estimation, choice of data, and safety margins? Put differently, is the
regulatory framework one of "innocent until proven guilty," under which
government must wait until a danger is obvious before taking action? How
much uncertainty should be tolerated?
Participants made several points about the information needed to address
these and other questions. Early in the workshop, participants noted that
greater use and increased understanding of performance standards requires
better systems to collect and analyze data on performance.2 9 Others added
that it is critical to consider who is going to collect the data, how often,
what the data will be used for, as well as what the incentives may be to
cheat and what can be done about them.
Without reliable data, debateg about the role of performance standards
will continue to be limited largely to anecdotes. In light of the absence of
empirical evaluations of performance-based standards, one participant
suggested using an adaptive learning or a learn-as-you-go approach. Given
some of the perceived limitations of predictive models, a participant raised
a further question about whether we should invest limited resources in
developing better models, or in gathering empirical data about the effects
28. Notarianni & Fischbeck, supra note 19, at 236 (noting that "many factors change
over the lifetime of a building," including "future use, occupancy, and other factors").

29. See generally
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of performance-based standards.
One participant argued that even though an advantage of performancebased regulation is that it can decentralize governance by giving firms
greater flexibility, the government must still monitor- each firm's
performance, and thus may be required to get so involved that it is
"6essentially running everything again." In some cases, the information
requirements for either a good performance standard or a good prescriptive
standard may be so demanding that these two approaches could be very
similar in terms of what the government needs to know.
Some participants noted an inconsistency between the Government
Performance and Results Act,30 which requires agencies to evaluate their
own performance, and the Paperwork Reduction Act, 3' which makes it
more difficult for agencies to gather information. Transitioning to a
performance-based regime requires that the government collect from
industry new and better data on performance and performance indicators,
but the Paperwork Reduction Act tends to constrain agencies from
collecting precisely the kind of data that may be needed.
Participants also discussed the role of experts in policymaking and the
importance of communicating information about performance and
uncertainty to the public. Several participants expressed concern about
relying on complex, predictive models of performance. They suggested
that many people lack the training to use or understand these models. As a
result, the number of people who can knowledgably participate in
regulatory decision-making declines as the complexity of the analysis
increases, thereby causing the government either to rely on third-party
experts (e.g., academics or consultants) to do much of the analysis, or to
accept too readily the analysis provided by the regulated entities. In such
cases, policymaking might be unduly influenced by non-governmental
actors, with an insufficient check on the "legitimate self-delusion" of
regulated entities.
Regardless of who conducts the analysis or the complexity of the results,
several participants argued that the information underlying performancebased regulation should be communicated in a way that is understandable
to the public. The public's perception of risk, it was noted, may be quite
different from the perceptions of government officials or industry
32
Effective communication about risk, uncertainty, and
representatives.
performance puts information into the hands of those ultimately affected by

30. GPRA, supra note 3.
31. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-20 (2000).
32. See Nancy Kraus et al., Intuitive Toxicology: Expert and Lay Judgments of
Chemical Risks, 12 RISK ANALYSIS 2, 215-31 (1992).
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regulatory policy and therefore promotes democratic values.33
IV. IMPLEMENTING PERFORMANCE-BASED REGULATION

Implementing performance-based regulation poses its own challenges,
especially when a government agency needs to make a transition from a
regime based heavily on design- or technology-based standards. As noted
earlier, participants acknowledged a lack of empirical research on the best
practices for implementing performance-based regulation.34
One
participant claimed that although there is a great deal of potential evidence
in the form of existing regulatory programs, gathering and analyzing it will
require substantial effort. Another participant suggested the need for a
"Consumer Reports" type of metric to be used to evaluate how well
performance-based and other regulations perform across different agencies.
Before such research proceeds, however, some participants recommended
that a better conceptual taxonomy of performance-based regulation be
developed to facilitate research and analysis.
Several participants noted agency and industry resistance to
performance-based regulation.
Some regulators, for example, resist
moving from prescriptive regulations, with which they are comfortable, to
performance-based regulations, which they consider ambiguous. These
regulators find it especially difficult to make the transition from hardwareoriented checklist inspections to inspections that call for them to judge the
quality and effectiveness of a facility's performance. 35 Even though
industry generally prefers the flexibility inherent in performance-based
regulation, many firms are anxious to avoid the ambiguity (and associated
increase in regulators' discretion) that sometimes accompanies
performance-based regulation.
Although there seems to be some movement toward performance-based
regulation within certain agencies, some participants found the progress to
be slow and limited. Participants noted at least three factors inhibiting the
transition to performance-based regulation, including (1) regulators'
comfort with the existing prescriptive approach, (2) measurement
problems, and (3) institutional path dependence due to existing legislation
oriented toward a design-based approach. One participant noted that it was
difficult to embed a new performance-based approach within a "designbased world." Another participant described his efforts to superimpose

33. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, IMPROVING
Academy Press 1989).
34. See supra text accompanying note 21.

RISK COMMUNICATION
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35. See MALCOLM SPARROW, THE REGULATORY CRAFT: CONTROLLING RISKS, SOLVING
PROBLEMS, AND MANAGING COMPLIANCE, 109-22 (2000) (noting the difficulty with

changing the focus of regulatory agencies, including enforcement staffs).
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performance-based standards onto the existing regulatory system as
"humbling," likening the process to making a change in the design of a
skyscraper after construction had already been completed.
A number of agency administrators who would like their organizations
to be results-driven wondered about strategies that could be used to
accelerate the application of performance-based approaches in systems that
were not designed for that purpose. How does the government adapt its
regulatory institutions to a performance-based approach? Are the transition
costs worth the benefits?
In response to these questions, several participants suggested that it may
take considerable time-possibly a generation-to make the transition to a
fully performance-based regime. Some suggested that regulatory regimes
do not change on their own; rather, it is the ability of regulatory decisionIt is
makers to acknowledge and absorb uncertainty that changes.
important to learn how to build mechanisms that will allow for learning
about, and fostering comfort with, new approaches to regulation. This
evolutionary process necessarily takes time, and so it is important to adopt
a long-term outlook.
Several factors were mentioned that might affect the speed of the
transition to performance-based regulation at different agencies. These
(1) the credibility of the regulators (e.g., several
factors included:
that
major accidents leading to political fallout will delay
noted
participants
any transition), (2) the readiness of the agency to embrace change
(measured perhaps as a. function of training budgets and workforce
demographics such as age, education, and level of tenure), and (3) the
economic environment (since there is, as one participant noted, an inverse
relationship between safety and cost). One participant also noted that, in a
different context, the transition to performance-based approaches in
procurement has faced similar obstacles (e.g., cultural inertia reflected by
statements such as "we've never done it that way before").36
One participant argued that performance-based regulations may
engender adverse, unintended behaviors. In other words, the flexibility that
performance-based standards provide to firms may be used in ways that
cause undesirable side effects, even if the firms still meet the performance
goal. Therefore, letting industry choose its own path always presents the
possibility of generating new or even larger risks. In contrast, design-based
standards provide clear direction to regulated entities and agency
36.

For a discussion of challenges in the area of government contracting, see STEVEN

KELMAN, PROCUREMENT AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: THE FEAR OF DISCRETION AND THE

QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE (1990); Steven Kelman, Strategic Contracting
Management, in MARKET BASED GOVERNANCE: SUPPLY SIDE, DEMAND SIDE, UPSIDE AND

DOwNSIDE 88-100 (John D. Donahue & Joseph S. Nye, Jr. eds., 2002).
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enforcement staff, an approach which may be satisfactory even if not,
strictly speaking, optimal.37
Several participants argued that making the transition to a performancebased system also requires changing the prevailing approach to
enforcement. Instead of simply determining whether a firm has installed
mandated technologies or otherwise achieved compliance, performancebased regulation may often require the application of performance
indicators so that agencies can intervene before an undesirable event
occurs. For example, the number of times that a nuclear power plant shuts
down annually may be one such performance indicator, since shutdowns do
not by themselves present a safety risk even though they do indicate that a
plant may be having problems. Some participants pointed out that
performance indicators should be embedded well below the level of the
ultimate objective to give regulators enough time to prevent bad
performance. For example, one agency developed performance indicators
using probabilistic risk assessment. The agency now assigns risk levels to
each firm based on periodic reviews of the firm's performance indicators.
If a firm receives two consecutive "risky" ratings, it is asked to propose
corrections. The agency progressively takes more control of facilities with
higher risk levels.
Many participants noted that it is important to develop adequate
performance measures or indicators. Ideally, such measures or indicators
would allow meaningful comparison of performance trends among firms.
However, this is often difficult to accomplish in practice. For example, the
impact of industry decisions and process improvements on performance is
not always immediate, sometimes taking years to manifest-especially
when the outcome of concern is a low-probability event, such as a nuclear
power plant accident. Moreover, in complex systems, it is often hard to
assess the impact of a specific change on a specific outcome because there
may be many changes occurring simultaneously. 38 In such situations,
meaningful performance measures or indicators may be difficult to define.
Some participants noted that performance-based standards (like design
standards) do not offer firms any incentive to go beyond compliance. To
encourage continuous improvement, participants suggested that the
government offer incentives to prod businesses into using their creative
talents to develop more effective and efficient solutions. For example, in
addition to setting a performance-based goal, the government could charge

37. See BREYER, supra note 1, at 105-6 (noting tradeoff between flexibility and
enforceability in choosing between performance and design standards).
38. For a discussion of the relationship between complexity and accident outcomes, see
CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES 62-100

(1984).
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a fee for behaviors that increase risk. This is one of the advantages of socalled market-based or incentive-based regulation.
When firms are
expected to pay an emissions or safety tax, or if they are allowed to trade
emissions credits, some of them will reduce their risks to levels lower than
they otherwise would have, achieving a more cost-effective overall level of
39
risk reduction.
Participants noted that all of the issues related to uncertainty described
earlier in this article make implementing performance-based regulation
difficult. One participant suggested that the uncertainty associated with
performance-based regulation may actually make it more difficult to
conduct economic analysis of performance standards, in a sense making it
harder for agencies to adopt an approach that should result in lower costs.
One participant also suggested that the Office of Management and
Budget's review process should take into account the different kinds of
information needed to assess performance standards, as opposed to
standards that specify the use of known technologies.
Many participants commented on the importance of dialogue among key
stakeholders when making the transition to a performance-based approach.
For example, many agreed that dialogue between government and industry
is important in developing performance-based standards. By engaging with
business, for example, the government can learn how difficult it may be for
small firms to respond to performance-based rules and that such firms may
prefer being told exactly what to do.40 Dialogue also can be used to
educate and inform stakeholders about performance-based regulation,
thereby making them more comfortable with the transition. Participants
also mentioned that dialogue may help expand the set of possibilities
available to regulators, as well as lead to the creation of industry-wide
yardsticks for assessing performance.
Even if dialogue does not result in a new rule, or change an existing rule,
one participant argued that the process can help the regulated community
39. See Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-BasedRegulation: Prescribing
Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & Soc'v. REv. 691, 701 (2003)
("[R]egulators enforcing market-based regulation still measure firms' performance for the
purpose of either assessing taxes or determining if firms possess an adequate number of
tradeable permits."); Viscusi, supra note 1, at 129 ("The best-known performance standard
in existence is the EPA 'bubble policy,' which relaxes the pollution standards for each
emissions point and imposes instead an overall requirement on emissions leaving a
hypothetical bubble over the plant."). For an overview of market-based instruments in the
area of environmental protection, see Robert N. Stavins, Market-Based Environmental
Policies: What Can We Learn From U.S. Experience (and Related Research)? (Res. for the
Future, Discussion Paper 03-43 2003), availableat http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFFDP-03-43.pdf.
40. See GUNNINGHAM & JOHNSTONE, supra note 10, at 31 (noting that small firms "lack
the skills, knowledge, or sophistication to devise their own least costs solutions to
[regulatory] problems" and therefore "require technical information and detailed practical
guidance").
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focus on why a problem is a concern and may help lead to change over
time. Another participant noted concern that not everyone affected by a
regulation will participate in the dialogue, though others suggested that
some dialogue is still probably better than none. Finally, participants
pointed out that performance data and careful program evaluation will be
necessary to inform both dialogue and agency decision-making.
CONCLUSION

Expanding the use of performance-based regulation holds promise for
achieving health, safety, and environmental goals at a lower cost and for
doing so in a way that accommodates if not encourages technological
innovation. Yet the advantages of performance-based regulation do not
necessarily mean that it is always the best regulatory strategy. Effective
performance-based regulation depends ultimately on a thorough
understanding of the nature of the problem that calls for government
intervention, including a clear account of the causes of and contributors to
that problem. In choosing a regulatory instrument to address a particular
problem, it will be useful to keep in mind that performance-based
regulation is but one of several choices. Moreover, as many workshop
participants noted, performance standards themselves differ in their
specificity, measurability, and feasibility.
Performance standards will be appropriate in some, and perhaps even
many, regulatory contexts. Some other situations will call for a hybrid
approach that either combines performance standards with design standards
(or codes of practice) or combines design standards with performancebased equivalency clauses.
Regardless of which options regulators
consider, they will confront some level of uncertainty. Performance-based
options may even draw greater attention to this uncertainty. As with any
decision-making, of course, addressing uncertainty calls for a careful
analysis of all the available evidence, as well as effective communication
of this evidence to decision-makers and the various affected parties.
Participants suggested that expanding the use of performance-based
regulation to new areas, even when appropriate, may prove difficult
because of resistance from those who are comfortable with the status quo.
Participants noted that in some cases a lack of data on performance, or on
performance-based standards, may contribute to the difficulties associated
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with implementing performance-based regulation. Many participants also
stressed the importance of further efforts to develop an informed dialogue
about performance-based regulation among government officials,
representatives of affected interests, and academic researchers.
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